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ABSTRACT: In his introduction to Husserl’s “Origin of Geometry”, Derrida makes several 
claims for the superiority of Husserl’s philosophy over Kant’s. The main claim of superiority is 
Husserl’s grounding of transcendental historicity and transcendental intersubjectivity in 
concrete experience. For Kant, Derrida points out, the truth of geometry is already constituted, 
and thus must be extrinsic to all history. But for Husserl, every ‘objectivity’ has a history, 
including geometrical objectivities, and these objectivities did not pre-exist the originary 
intuitive act. I will explore these claims, as they reach into the heart of issues concerning time 
and temporality.  
First, I will consider Derrida’s interpretation of Husserl, and argue that there is an unclarity or 
a contradiction in Husserl’s treatment of the temporality of ideal objects, which arises from his 
avoidance of the issue of whether ideal objects pre-exist their first intuiting. Derrida interprets 
Husserl as if Husserl had indeed dealt with this issue, thus avoiding the same issue in turn. I will 
examine the arguments in support of Derrida’s interpretation, but will provide reasons for 
rejecting each argument. Then I consider various ways of resolving the ambiguity, and will 
conclude by looking at the implications of Derrida’s avoidance of this issue for the project of 
deconstruction in general.  
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“In this situation, Sigwart does not seem to me to press forward to a clear 
position.”  Husserl, Logical Investigations I, p. 150 
“… (let us leave to one side the grave problem of a world antecedent to this 
idea)…” Derrida, Problem of Genesis in Husserl, p. 170 
 
Did the ideal objects of geometry pre-exist the work of the Ur-geometer?  Were the 
geometrical equations true before formulated by the Ur-geometer?  Was Newton’s law 
of gravitation true before Newton lived?  Did the sun exist before there were human 
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beings?  Do geology and paleontology make meaningful, descriptive claims about 
times prior to human existence?  What can be said of the world prior to the idea of 
philosophy?  Did time pass before there were human beings?  These questions are 
variations of a single problem which I call the problem of prior sense.  This problem 
most pointedly touches the dispute between transcendental idealism and 
phenomenology1, on the one hand, and empirical realism, on the other, yet it has been 
difficult for phenomenologists to focus on this problem.2  This paper aims to fill this 
gap in the literature.3 
Derrida claimed that Husserl made a clear advance over Kant in dealing with this 
problem.  For Husserl, according to Derrida, ideal objects did not pre-exist their 
originary intuiting. Yet when one looks at Husserl’s treatment of the issue, one sees 
that right to the end of his writings, Husserl never clearly takes a stand on this issue.  
This is especially striking as at the beginning of his career, in the Logical 
Investigations, he accuses Sigwart of waffling on a variant of this problem.  According 
to Husserl, on Sigwart’s theory “[t]he judgment expressed in the formula of gravitation 
was not true before the time of Newton.”4  As the epigraph above shows, Husserl is 
sharply critical of Sigwart for not being more definitive on the question.  In part I, I 
will argue that Husserl falls prey to the criticism he levels against Sigwart. Contra 
Derrida, he never takes a clear stand on whether an ideality pre-exists its originary 
intuiting. 
Derrida thus irons out an irresolution in Husserl’s views.  In doing so, he leaves 
unclear how the originary intuition of an ideal object—“absolutely constitutive and 
creative”, according to Derrida—is to be reconciled with the omnitemporality of the 
ideal object.  In leaving this point unclear, I will argue in part 2, Derrida also fails to 
come to grips with the problem of prior sense, a failure which takes place in spite of his 
1 I am not going to differentiate between phenomenology and transcendental phenomenology here for a 
number of reasons:  Husserl is concerned with this problem from the beginning of his career.  Derrida 
emphasizes continuity over discontinuity in Husserl’s writings.  The problem is inherent in the concept of 
Sinngebung, and doesn’t await Husserl’s Ideas.  Readers concerned about this may insert “transcendental” 
prior to phenomenology. 
2 Quentin Meillassoux has recently focused on this problem, which he calls the “ancestor problem”, and 
tackled it directly. See Meillassoux, “Metaphysics, Speculation, Correlation,” Pli—Warwick Journal of 
Philosophy (2011), pp. 1-24.  He doesn’t discuss the texts which I discuss in this paper, so I am postponing a 
discussion of his approach for another paper.   
3 None of the major books on Husserl and Derrida treat this problem.  This is not a criticism of these 
books—their authors are interested in other matters.  See Paola Marrati, Genesis and Trace—Derrida Reading 
Husserl and Heidegger (Stanford, 2005); Leonard Lawlor, Derrida and Husserl—The Basic Problem of 
Phenomenology (Indiana, 2002); Joshua Kates, Essential History—Jacques Derrida and the Development of 
Deconstruction (Northwestern, 2005).  
4 Logical Investigations, I, trans. Findlay (Routledge, 1970), p. 150. 
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engagement with the issue in his treatment of Husserl’s “Origin of Geometry”.  The 
avoidance of the problem announced in The Problem of Genesis in Husserl’s Philosophy 
(quoted in the other epigraph5) was actually continued through his career. 
The ambiguity in Derrida’s though will be established (also in part II) through 
considering three ways that the omnitemporality of idealities could be reconciled with 
their non-existence prior to their first intuiting.  These views are not abstractions, but 
philosophical views stated in texts which Derrida knew or probably knew.  The 
significance of these texts and Derrida’s failure to discuss them will be considered in 
the conclusion. 
I. 
In his introduction to Husserl’s “Origin of Geometry”, Derrida claims the superiority 
of Husserl over Kant in that Husserl grounds transcendental historicity in concrete 
experience.  According to Derrida, Husserl differs from Kant in that, for Husserl 
geometrical objects6 do not pre-exist the founding moment, the “instituting origin” of 
geometry.  “…the inaugural mutation which interests Kant hands over geometry rather 
than creates it;  it sets free a possibility, which is nothing less than historical, in order to 
hand it to us.  At first this ‘revolution’ is only a ‘revelation for’ the first geometer.  It is 
not produced by him. …Undoubtedly, Husserl’s production (Leistung) also involves a 
stratum of receptive intuition.  But what matters here is that this Husserlian intuition, 
as it concerns the ideal objects of mathematics, is absolutely constitutive and creative:  
the objects or objectivities that it intends did not exist before it…”7  Derrida’s reading of 
Husserl is unequivocal:  the ideal objects of mathematics did not exist prior to their 
first, productive intuiting. 
We can consider this as the problem of prior sense.  I use the latter term because it 
has the broadest and most fundamental meaning for Husserl.  Its breadth includes 
objects, “objectivities”, idealities, and truths.  The various questions set forth at the 
opening of this paper—some considered by Husserl, others by other philosophers I will 
discuss—will arise under this heading in the course of this paper.  Neither Husserl nor 
Derrida differentiates between these in treating this problem, so I will not do so here.  
Because what is ultimately at stake here is the status of transcendental idealism, the last 
5 The “idea” referred to in the quote is the idea of philosophy;  in the passage from which the 
parenthetical remark is drawn, Derrida is talking about how the idea of philosophy only comes to itself 
completely with the idea of phenomenology.  He excludes the issue of the world prior to the origin. 
6 And all ‘objectivities’, a concept which would include equations and numbers and states-of-affairs and 
melodies, as well as ideal shapes. 
7 Derrida, “Introduction”, in Husserl, “L’origine de geometrie (PUF, 1962). pp. 22-23; Leavey trans. (Nebraska, 
1989), pp. 39-40. 
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of these questions will be of particular interest:  Did time pass before there were 
human beings?  
The problem is that Husserl never specifically says that geometrical objectivities do 
not pre-exist the protogeometer’s originary intuition of them.8  Indeed, he seems to say 
quite the opposite since he states that they are omnitemporal, and ‘all times’ would 
include times prior to the first formulation of geometry.  Given this apparent 
contradiction, and given Husserl’s awareness of the problem of prior sense, I think it is 
reasonable that we only attribute a specific view to Husserl on this point if we find an 
explicit statement by him.   
Nevertheless, Derrida’s interpretation has much going for it.  First, it is of the 
greatest interest to Husserl in the “Origin” that the proto-geometer’s act is “creative”, 
and refers to him as the “inventor” and “creator” of geometry.  Additionally, in the 
“Origin”, he specifically includes mathematical and scientific achievements as cultural 
productions—along with literature and artworks.  Second, Husserl repeatedly uses the 
word “erzeugen” or “production” in referring to the origin of geometry.  If we focus on 
the word “erzeugen”, we could build an argument that Husserl changed his view on this 
point.  While in the Logical Investigations, Husserl says that numbers are not touched by 
temporality or contingency9, we should note that also in the Logical Investigations (in the 
discussion of temporality raised by Sigwart), Husserl says that the concept or content 
of a presentation “can be meant, but not produced (erzeugt)”.10  In his later writings, 
erzeugen is Husserl’s favored word for treating the constitution of idealities.  Third, 
Derrida is correct in saying that Husserl wants to establish that every objectivity has a 
history.  
 I see a number of very solid reasons for challenging each of the three reasons 
offered in support of Derrida’s interpretation.  I will discuss each in turn.   
8 I am only concerned here with what Husserl explicitly says.  Phenomenologists will no doubt 
immediately consider what he should have said, and how he would have treated the various questions 
grouped here under the problem of prior sense.  This could be worthwhile for other purposes, but for my 
purposes here, I believe it is more fruitful to consider why he didn’t thematise this problem. 
9 Specifically, he says that the number five is an “ideal form-species, which is absolutely one in the sense of 
arithmetic, whatever mental act it may be individuated for us in an intuitively constituted collective, a 
species which is untouched by the contingency, temporality and transience of our mental acts.  Acts of 
counting arise and pass away and cannot be meaningfully mentioned in the same breath as numbers.”  
Logical Investigations I, p. 180. 
10 Logical Investigations I, p. 151. “Es kann im Denken gemeint, aber nicht im denken erzeugt sein.” Logische 
Untersuchungen (Meiner, 2009), p. 138.  (Although Derrida argues for the continuity of Husserl’s thought in 
Speech and Phenomena, the claim that Husserl changed his view on this point would fit in with Derrida’s 
comment in Problem of Genesis that Husserl came to understand contingency better over the course of his 
writing.) 
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1.  Creative 
With regard to the first, it is worth noting that Husserl was also concerned in Experience 
and Judgment with establishing that “categorial objectivities”—states of affairs and sets, 
primarily, but also mathematics—were the result of “creative achievement”, yet there 
he says that irreal objects are valid prior to their “discovery”—Husserl’s scare-quotes: 
Objectivities of the understanding make their appearance in the world (a state of 
affairs is ‘discovered’) as irreal; after having been discovered, they can be thought 
of anew and as often as desired and, in general, can be objects of experience 
according to their nature.  But afterwards we say:  even before they were 
discovered, they were already ‘valid’; or we say that they can be assumed—
provided that subjects which have the ability to produce them are present and 
conceivable—to be producible precisely at any time, and that they have this 
mode of omnipresent existence:  in all possible modes of production they would 
be the same.  Similarly, we say:  ‘there are’ mathematical and other irreal objects 
which no one has yet constructed.  Their existence, to be sure is revealed only by 
their construction (their ‘experience’), but the construction of those already 
known opens in advance a horizon of objects capable of being further discovered, 
although still unknown.”11 
The various hedges, combined with the unusual circumstances involved in the writing 
of the book, make it impossible to give a definitive reading of this passage.  But the 
passage suggests it is possible that the production of ideal objects is not inconsistent 
with their being a discovery, as Husserl uses the term both in scare-quotes and without 
them.  The comments are framed in terms of what “we say”, but nowhere in the 
section, or indeed, in the book does he return in order to disavow these claims.  In the 
very next page, Husserl makes the claim of the omnitemporality of categorical 
objectivities on the basis of their supertemporality, and the passage above appears to 
be taken as having established that basis.  Finally, the qualification concerning the 
abilities of subjects (“provided that subjects which have the ability to produce them are 
present and conceivable”) imports into the quotation exactly the same problem that 
we are exploring, but since it leaves open what is meant by “ability”, “present”, 
“conceivable”, it cannot be said to resolve it. 
Following up the question of whether geometry should be said to be discovered, 
produced, created, or invented, the use of the terms Leistung or Schöpfung are not as 
conclusive as they may sound.  This production is an intentional act, from the very 
beginning one has had to be cautious in drawing conclusions about intentionality from 
the terms used by Husserl to characterize it.  Husserl himself cautions in the Logical 
Investigations that an intentional act is not an activity:  “In talking of ‘acts’, on the other 
11 Experience and Judgment, trans. Churchill and Ameriks (Northwestern, 1973), sec. 64c, p. 260. 
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hand, we must steer clear of the word’s original meaning:  all thought of activity must be 
rigidly excluded.”  Husserl adds a footnote to this sentence, the conclusion of which says:  
“We too reject the ‘mythology of activities’:  we define ‘acts’ as intentional experiences, 
not as mental activities.”12  
Objects pre-exist their constitution for an ego, in spite of what one would 
ordinarily think is implied by the word constitution.  Would it also be a mistake to 
infer from the use of the terms “production” (in addition to Leistung, Husserl uses the 
term erzeugen) and “creation”, which are stressed by Husserl in the “Origin” and the 
Crisis, that the objects “produced” and “created” did not pre-exist their production 
and creation?  As eminent a Husserl scholar as Paul Ricoeur thought so:  “But as we 
have said above, this ‘creating’ is so little a ‘making’ in the mundane sense that it is a 
‘seeing.’  Here I agree with G. Berger…”13   
Husserl does include the origin of geometry, along with creation of art, as matters 
of cultural productions, but he also differentiates them.  He only notes one difference 
between them—that unlike literary works, objective sciences can be translated into 
foreign languages with identical (authentic, direct) accessibility.14  Although this 
difference is unrelated to temporality, it indicates that Husserl doesn’t identify them in 
all respects and that the possibility that they also differ in their temporality is not 
excluded.  While this discussion in the “Origin” is quite suggestive, it is not 
determinative. 
2.  Erzeugen 
Husserl refers to the origin of geometry as an “Erfindung” (invention) and, more often 
an “Erzeugung” in the “Origin” essay.  There are two problems with building one’s 
argument on these terms.  First, they don’t fit well together because they have a 
somewhat different meaning, a difference of some importance for this issue at hand.  
The type/token distinction is embedded in these terms; it would seem to be found in 
common German.  Here I will merely rely on my Wahrig Wörterbuch der deutschen 
Sprache.  “Erfinden” is defined as applying to “something not yet available; something 
totally new, especially technology.”  The example given is “Edison hat die Glühlampe 
erfunden.”  Husserl does use this term in the “Origin of Geometry”, but his preferred 
term is erzeugen, which is defined in two ways, with regard to the production (1) of etwas 
or (2) of eine Sache.  Re etwas:  “bring forth, produce, manufacture, esp. agricultural 
12 Logical Investigations, vol. II, Investigation 5, sec. 13, p. 563. 
13 Ricoeur, Husserl, trans. Ballard and Embree (Northwestern, 1967), p. 27n. 19. 
14 The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology, trans. Carr (Northwestern, 1970), p. 357; Die 
Krisis der Europäischen Wissenschaften und die Transcendentale Phänomenologie,2nd ed., edited by Biemel (Nijhoff, 
1962), p. 368. 
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products.”  The examples: to produce more milk, eggs than last year, more goods, 
machines; more electricity, gas.  Re Sache:  “allow to arise, call forth, cause”.  The 
examples:  The sun produces warmth; to produce boredom, anxiety, mistrust.   
So production (erzeugen) involves the creation of a particular that did not exist 
before, but of a type that did exist before.  Invention (erfinden) involves the creation of a 
type of thing which did not exist before.  On Husserl’s view of ideality, an ideality is 
one where the type/token distinction breaks down.  Thus I do not think we can draw 
any conclusions simply from Husserl’s use of these words.  Husserl would need to have 
discussed these words and their relation to the issue of temporality explicitly.  His 
failure to do so I believe shows an avoidance of the issue. 
The second problem with basing an argument is that Husserl does not use 
“erzeugen” for the first time in the “Origin” essay.  He is already referring to the 
intending of idealities with this term in Formal and Transcendental Logic and Experience and 
Judgment.15  The most important passage is in the Formal and Transcendental Logic (§63) 
where Husserl explains the sense of the phrase “production of logical formations”.  
This passage is highly suggestive of Ricoeur’s and Berger’s interpretation noted above.  
It aligns “Erzeugung” with “perception”, rather than creation.  “Perception” is supplied 
with quotation marks, but nevertheless: 
  …they [ideal objectivities] are what they are, only “as coming from” an 
original production.  But that is not at all to say that they are what they are, only 
in and during the original production.  That they are “in” the original production 
signifies that they are intended to in it, as a certain intentionality having the form 
of spontaneous activity, and more particularly in the mode of belonging to the original 
objectivity itself.  This manner of givenness—givenness as something coming from such original 
activity—is nothing other than the sort of “perception” proper to them.  Or, what is the 
same thing, this originally acquiring activity is the “evidence” appropriate to these 
idealities.  Evidence, quite universally…  This evident-making activity of 
consciousness—in the present case a spontaneous activity that is hard to 
explore—is the “original constitution”, stated more pregnantly, the primally 
institutive constitution, of ideal objectivities of the sort with which logic is 
concerned. (p. 168) 
This entire section of FTL deserves careful consideration, but for the moment, I can 
only note that here, unlike in his discussion of Sigwart in the Logical Investigations, 
intention and production are no longer contrasted.  Second, even if we don’t place too 
much weight on the word “perception”, Husserl is most concerned here with aligning 
“production” with “evidence”, which tends to diminish the likelihood that the term 
“production” means prior non-existence.   
15 The discussion of the temporality of idealities in Experience and Judgment is ambiguous. 
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3.  History   
Turning now to the third reason--Derrida’s reliance on Husserl’s desire to establish 
that every objectivity has a history.  It may be that Husserl’s view changed on the 
specific point at issue here, but I would tend to agree with Derrida’s tendency in 
interpreting Husserl as in general maintaining consistency through his writings.16  In 
addition to discussions of mathematics and logic, Husserl treats the problem in 
occasional references to geology and paleontology, and these references suggest that 
Husserl did not change his views during his career.  In these references, Husserl 
accepts at face value their claims concerning descriptive statements about times prior 
to the origin of human beings.  In the Logical Investigations, he relies on this point in his 
argument against anthropologism:  “No one has in fact ever thought of rejecting as 
absurd those geological and physical theories which give the human race a beginning 
and end in time.”17  In the Crisis, Husserl qualifies geology and paleontogy as achieved 
mediately, yet still accepts them as descriptive sciences:  “Thus geology and 
paleontology are ‘descriptive sciences’ even though they reach into climatic periods of 
the earth in which the analogous intuitions of inductively inferred living beings cannot 
in principle represent possible experience.”18  The quotation marks could be 
interpreted as scare-quotes, challenging the designation of these sciences as descriptive; 
but they could just as well be plain quotation marks, appealing to what is commonly 
accepted as support, just as Husserl does in other passages already quoted.  If he has 
changed his view from the Logical Investigations on truth, he doesn’t say so here. 
Additional light is shed on Husserl’s views of the historicity of science by two 
closely related passages in “Philosophy as a Rigorous Science”: 
 The ‘idea’ of Weltanschauung is consequently a different one for each time, a 
fact that can be seen without difficulty from the preceding analysis of its concept.  
The ‘idea’ of science, on the contrary, is a supratemporal one, and here that 
means limited by no relatedness to the spirit of one time.  Now, along with these 
differences go essential differences of practical orientations.  After all, our life 
goals are in general of two kinds, some temporal, others eternal, some serving our 
own perfection and that of our own contemporaries, others the perfection of 
posterity, too, down to the most remote generations.  Science is a title standing 
for absolute, timeless values.  Every such value, once discovered, belongs 
thereafter to the treasure trove of all succeeding humanity and obviously 
16 Derrida opens Speech and Phenomena with this point.  Speech and Phenomena, trans. Allison (Northwestern, 
1973), p. 3. 
17 Logical Investigations, vol. I, p. 142. 
18 Crisis, p. 239.  The views expressed here do not differ from those in the “Origin of Geometry”.  
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determines the material content of the idea of culture, wisdom, Weltanschauung 
philosophy.19 
This passage shows Husserl’s concern with making science—and rigorous 
philosophy—an acquisition which is true once and for all, and which determines 
culture rather than vice versa.   It is of the utmost concern to Husserl that science 
(including mathematics and rigorous philosophy) not be temporally limited.  In this 
particular passage, it is unclear whether the origin of ideal objects which Derrida 
attributes to Husserl in his reading of the “Origin” would be acceptable; the origin in a 
concrete action is a limit, but one which affects the past and not the future.20  But it 
would seem that Husserl rejects this possibility a bit further on: 
All ‘wisdom’ or wisdom doctrine whose origin is mathematical or in the realm of 
natural science has, to the extent that the corresponding theoretical doctrine has 
been given an objectively valid foundation, forfeited its rights.  Science has 
spoken; from now on, it is for wisdom to learn.  The striving toward wisdom in 
the realm of natural science was not, so to speak, unjustified before the existence 
of strict science; it is not retroactively discredited for its own time.  In the urgency 
of life that in practice necessitates adopting a position, man could not wait 
until—say, after even supposing that he already knew the idea of strict science at 
all.21 
When judging intellectual endeavors and the statements issued from them prior to the 
advent of science, Husserl would not condemn them.  However, on Derrida’s view the 
question of condemnation would be ruled out on the ground that science and 
mathematics were not true prior to their origin.  In contrast, Husserl withholds 
condemnation on the basis of standard moral excuses—urgency of action and 
ignorance.   
In considering his trajectory, we should consider what it is that Husserl wants to 
establish with the claim that every objectivity has a history.  In his later writings, 
Husserl is responding to Heidegger, showing that phenomenology is ‘relevant’ to the 
individual and to current issues.  He is staking out Heidegger’s territory—history, 
tradition, culture—and trying to show that phenomenology as he conceived of it can 
cover these areas.  This shift involved a shift of emphasis.  Phenomenology had always 
had an “ego-pole” and an “object-pole”.  Husserl’s turn toward culture allowed him to 
work the subjective side.  Previously, he had emphasized the object side and objectivity 
pursuant to his attempts to combat historicism and psychologism.  For example, in 
“Philosophy as a Rigorous Science”, he emphasizes phenomenology’s alliance with 
19 Husserl, Shorter Works, edited by McCormick and Elliston (Notre Dame, 1981), p. 191. 
20 The question of why it should not affect the future would perhaps be a cause of worry. 
21 Husserl, Shorter Works, p. 192. 
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and continuity with science.  He reserves marking phenomenology’s distance from 
science until the very end of the essay.  Throughout his writings, Husserl’s take on the 
accumulation of knowledge—e.g., the historicity of science—remains the same:  
knowledge as acquisition, permanent possession, evidence, tradition, sedimentation 
and re-animation.  In establishing that objectivities have a history, he is concerned 
with establishing this picture of the accumulation of knowledge.  The question of the 
pre-existence of those objectivities prior to their discovery or production is simply not 
one which he wishes (or is able) to tackle in the “Origin”.22 
II. 
Suppose we accept Derrida’s interpretation of Husserl.  In that case, he must be seen 
as making explicit a point which is not clearly made by Husserl.  And although 
Derrida here helps to clarify Husserl, there remains an apparent contradiction in the 
“Origin”.  Now we have to reconcile the prior non-existence of idealities with their 
omnitemporality.  “All times” would seem to include times prior to the origin. 
The question of the temporality of geometry comes up near the beginning of the 
essay, and then returns at the end.  First, Husserl says:  “Indeed, it has, from its primal 
establishment, an existence which is peculiarly supertemporal and which—of this we 
are certain—is accessible to all men, first of all to the actual and possible 
mathematicians of all peoples, all ages; and this is true of all its particular forms.”23  
Although it would be natural to read this quote with an implied “subsequent” inserted 
in the phrases “all people” and “all ages”, without this clarification one can also read it 
as avoiding the issue.  The question would be:  what about the people who lived and 
the ages which passed prior to the origin of geometry?  We might look to the end of 
the essay where the same issue of temporality arises.  Here we find in close proximity 
22 I don’t think there is any way to attribute a definite view to Husserl on this point.  Husserl’s avoidance 
stems from issues related to his treatment of temporality and his concerns with science.  Regarding 
temporality, Husserl’s problem arises out of fundamental problems in phenomenology and in Husserl’s 
treatment of time, which go far beyond the paradoxes which Derrida highlights in his treatment of 
Husserl’s texts.  One need only try to reconcile Husserl’s point in Experience and Judgment that all 
individuation is only possible “on the basis of absolute temporal position” (p. 173) with the remainder of 
his account of time, which privileges inner time-consciousness.  (Or with his priority of what is known 
immediately or immediately experienceable, as evidenced by the quote from the Crisis on geology and 
paleontology.)  Fundamental as this point is, though, Husserl never took it to be a refutation of 
phenomenology.  It surfaces occasionally, as shown in the above quotes, but Husserl seems to me to be 
avoiding it in the “Origin”.  With regard to science, as noted above, Husserl has the utmost concern 
throughout his career with establishing that scientific achievements are permanent acquisitions.  He 
simply doesn’t care much about their status prior to their first formulation. 
23 Husserl, “Origin of Geometry” Crisis, p. 356. 
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two quotes which, assuming that we interpret the first as Derrida does, make the 
contradiction apparent: 
It is evident in advance that this new sort of construction will be a product 
[Erzeugnis] arising out of an idealizing, spiritual act, one of “pure” thinking, which 
has its materials in the designated general pregivens of this factual humanity and 
human surrounding world and creates [schafft] “ideal objects” out of them. 
(“Origin of Geometry”, in Crisis, pp. 376-7) 
 It is a general conviction that geometry, with all its truths, is valid with 
unconditioned generality for all men, all times, all peoples, and not merely for all 
historically factual ones but for all conceivable ones.  The presuppositions of 
principle for this conviction have never been explored because they have never 
been seriously made a problem.” (p. 377) 
The apparent contradiction is striking.  On the one hand, ideal objects were ‘created’ 
and thus did not pre-exist their intellectual origin, nor did the truths about them.  On 
the other hand, the truths of geometry held for all times, including those prior to their 
intellectual origin.   
I will examine three ways of resolving the apparent contradiction.  In the first two, 
we alter the meaning of “omnitemporality”, while in the third we import one of 
Derrida’s concepts.  Along with each proposal, I will discuss a text that makes a very 
closely related claim.  Each is a text that Derrida knew or probably knew.  At this 
point, I am less interested in Husserl’s views than on Derrida’s.  It strikes me as quite 
problematic that Derrida never addressed any of these texts. 
a)  Change the meaning of ‘omni’:  ‘all times’ means ‘all subsequent times’.   
When Husserl says that what is important for him is that the ‘ideal construction’ can 
be “understood for all future time and by all coming generations of men” (p. 377), this 
is not to be taken to be consistent with the omnitemporality of geometry.24  Instead it 
would be a limitation or modification of the meaning of the ‘omni’ in 
omnitemporality, likewise for the ‘all’ in ‘all men’.  Each such mention in Husserl’s text 
should be read as implicitly meaning ‘all subsequent times’ and ‘all subsequent people’.  
This interpretation neatly solves the problem with regard to geometry as well as the 
existence of the sun, although it does leave us hanging with regard to the question of 
whether time passed before there were human beings. 
I associate this resolution with a particular text of Georges Bataille.  At the 
beginning of a talk Bataille gave in the 1951, the first of his Conferences sur Non-savoir, he 
24 Nor would we be reading it as raising an unresolved inconsistency.  That is the reading I propose in part 
one; here I am assuming that the inconsistency is merely apparent. 
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expressed exasperation about an opinion that A.J. Ayer had expressed during a 
drinking session the previous night.  Ayer had stated as unquestionably obvious that 
the sun existed before there were human beings: 
In the end, we had the opportunity to talk about a fairly strange question.  Ayer 
asserted this very simple proposition:  the sun existed before man.  And he 
couldn’t even doubt it.  It so happened that Merleau-Ponty, Ambrosino (a 
physician), and myself were not of the same mind on this proposition, and 
Ambrosino said that certainly the sun had not existed before the world.  For my 
part, I don’t see how anyone can say that.  This is a proposition that indicates the 
perfect non-sense that a reasonable proposition can assume. … 
I must say that yesterday’s conversation was a scandal.  There is a sort of abyss 
between French philosophers and English philosophers, which isn’t there 
between French philosophers and German philosophers.25 
Of course, Bataille is talking about the sun, not geometry.  But the passage raises the 
same issues of temporality, idealism, and description.  Bataille’s position here seems 
exceptionally strange given his polemics against Andre Breton, in which he accused 
Breton of idealism.  It turns out that Bataille could only accept that the meaning of the 
world was parody and excrement if that meaning was conferred by human beings.26 
Did Derrida read this talk?  This question is not as easy as to answer as it might 
appear.  The editorial notes in Bataille’s Oeuvres Complètes can be misleading, as it says 
that Tel Quel published the original manuscripts of the lectures (VIII: 558).27  Derrida 
cites the Conferences sur nonsavoir extensively in his essay on Bataille of 1967, but Bataille’s 
talk was not published in Tel Quel in 1962 with the other talks on nonsavoir.  Although it 
was not included in the original publication, Derrida would have had access to it in the 
offices of Tel Quel due to his connections with Sollers and the Tel Quel group.  If he had 
known about it, he would have read it. 
25 Georges Bataille, “The Consequences of Nonknowledge,” in The Unfinished System of Nonknowledge, edited 
by Stuart Kendall, translated by Michelle Kendall and Stuart Kendall (Minnesota, 2001), pp. 111-112.  For 
interesting context regarding this meeting, see Andreas Vrahimis, “’Was There a Sun Before We Existed?’ 
A.J. Ayer and French Philosophy in the Fifties,” Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy, vol. 1, no. 9 
(2012): 1-25. 
26 This judgment is supported by a number of passages in L’experience interieure and Le Coupable.  See for 
example p. 68 of the “Collection tel” edition of L’experience interieure (Gallimard, 1954) on the object as a 
projection of the subject (trans. p. 54).  There are also passages pointing to the opposite conclusion, such 
as on pp. 83-4 of the same work regarding the material precarity of the subject. 
27 Regarding the specific talk in question, the editors say “Nous ne retrouvons cet exposé qu’une transcription 
dactylographée [Boîte 16, C 10-20], non publiée par “Tel Quel.””  In order to confirm the suggestion that this talk 
was not published at all by Tel Quel, one needs to fill in the gaps and note that not only did the editors of 
OC not have a manuscript, neither did the editors of Tel Quel.  Thus they published the manuscripts of the 
talks for which they had a manuscript. 
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I think that it is highly likely that he did know about it.  In his Bataille essay, 
Derrida also cites two of Bataille’s unpublished writings, the “Vielle Taupe” essay and 
the Theory of Religion.28  Given that the “Vielle Taupe” essay was published in 1968 
in Tel Quel, I think that it is reasonable to conclude that he obtained it from Tel Quel.  
Knowing that he read at least one unpublished essay in Tel Quel’s files and given his 
interest in nonsavoir and in Bataille’s unpublished writings in general, he would have 
read any other such writings in the files of the review.  The fact that he doesn’t cite this 
passage hardly counts as evidence against his knowing it, as will be established by his 
failure to cite or discuss the passages discussed below which he unquestionably knew. 
b)  Change the meaning of ‘temporality’ in ‘omnitemporality’ 
For Husserl, time has a special connection to the origin of geometry.  By focusing on 
this connection we can offer a second way of resolving the apparent contradiction in 
Derrida’s interpretation of Husserl.  In “The Origin of Geometry”, Husserl says: 
As a philosopher proceeding from the practical, finite surrounding world (of the 
room, the city, the landscape, etc., and temporally the world of periodic 
occurrences:  day, month, etc.) to the theoretical world-view and world-
knowledge, he has the finitely known and unknown spaces and times as finite 
elements within the horizon of an open infinity.  But with this he does not yet 
have geometrical space, mathematical time, and whatever else is to become a 
novel spiritual product out of these finite elements which serve as material;…” (p. 
376) 
One might posit that there is a transformation in time itself with the origin of 
geometry, and that what came before was a finite, inexact time.  And if infinite, 
mathematical time is time in the true sense, then one can say that there was no time 
prior to the creation of geometry.  The question of whether geometrical objects pre-
existed their creation does not arrive because there can be no question of “pre-
existence”, of a true “before”.  This may seem like a stretch, especially if we shift the 
question:  Did time pass before there were human beings?  On the view that I’m 
setting forth with this alternative, the answer would be no. 
As bizarre as such a view seems to common sense and scientific discourse, this 
would be in no way an unusual position for phenomenology, and it is indeed the view 
that Heidegger explicitly puts forth in Introduction to Metaphysics: 
After all, there was a time when there were no human beings.  But strictly 
speaking, we cannot say there was a time when there were no human beings.  At 
28 See, respectively, the footnotes on pages 401 and 403 of L’Ecriture et la difference (Seuil, 1967). 
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every time, there were and are and will be human beings, because time 
temporalizes itself only as long as there are human beings.29 
There is a close parallel here between Heidegger’s and Husserl’s view here, because 
Heidegger states that an understanding of Being is necessary to our being human.  So 
the question of whether time passes prior to there being humans has the same 
ambiguity for Heidegger as the question of whether time passed prior to the origin of 
geometry for Husserl.  In each case there is an event which would normally be taken 
as historical but is instead claimed to be the opening onto history; for Heidegger that 
event would be the Seinsverstehen of the Presocratics, rather than the origin of geometry.  
Then the question can be pushed farther, asking if time passed before there were 
human beings, before there were sentient beings, before planets had cooled?  Without 
the passing of time, it becomes difficult to make sense of these questions and 
distinguish these ‘befores’ and these (supposed non-)events.  I think it is quite 
disconcerting that Derrida never discussed this passage, especially given his 
indebtedness to Heidegger on matters concerning time.30 
c)  Bring in Derrida’s concept of nachträglichkeit or retroactivity.    
This is seemingly the most Derridean way of resolving the apparent conflict.  Until the 
origin of geometry, the geometrical objects did not yet exist.  But their pre-existence is 
retroactive or nachträglich; even though they did not exist up to the origin, nevertheless, 
after the origin they will have existed prior to the origin.  This ‘past which was never 
present’ fits Derrida’s concept exactly.  And we know that the concept applies outside 
of the psychoanalytic context in which Derrida first elucidates it (Freud essay), as 
Derrida uses it in such a way in Of Grammatology.  There, though, Derrida uses it to 
show that the ‘origin’ is a retroactive effect of what comes later; he never uses it in the 
case of what comes before the origin.31 
Curiously, there is a philosopher who squarely faces the question with which we 
are dealing—and relied on nachträglichkeit to deal with the problem, although he did not 
use the word.  This philosopher wrote before Derrida, before Heidegger, and before 
Husserl.  It was Schopenhauer who considered whether there was time before there 
were knowers, and said that there was no time until there was a knower, after which 
29 Introduction to Metaphysics, trans. Polt and Fried (Yale, 2000), pp. 88-89. 
30 It hardly needs noting that Derrida was thoroughly familiar with Introduction to Metaphysics, but for those 
who would like references, Derrida cites the book more than once in “Violence et Metaphysique” in L’Ecriture 
et la difference.  See the footnotes on pages 206, 209, and 214. 
31 Interesting, nachträglikeit is discussed by Lacan in the first lecture of his seminar on “Le moi” on 
November 17, 1954.  See Le Séminaire livre II: Le moi dans la theorie de Freud et dans la technique de la psychanalyse 
(Seuil, 1978), pp. 11-23.  This idea may have had a general currency in Paris by the time Derrida published 
his translation of Husserl’s “Origin of Geometry”. 
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there had been time.  Schopenhauer places this originary moment (perhaps) with an 
insect: 
...each more highly organized state of matter succeeded in time a cruder state.  
Thus animals existed before men, fishes before land animals, plants before fishes, 
and the inorganic before that which is organic; consequently, the original mass 
had to go through a long series of changes before the first eye that opened, were 
it even that of an insect.32  
Schopenhauer explicitly states the problem as a contradiction between the need for 
“that long course of time” prior to knowing, and his view that time does not pre-exist 
knowing:  “But without that eye, in other words, outside of knowledge, there was no 
before, no time.” (p. 31) He then notes that the first moment of time projects backward 
an infinite past:  “…time with its whole infinity in both directions is also present in the 
first knowledge.” (p. 31) “Accordingly the past, out of which the first present arises, is, 
like it, dependent on the knowing subject, and without this it is nothing.  It happens of 
necessity, however, that this first present does not manifest itself as the first, in other 
words, as having no past for its mother, and as being the beginning of time; but rather 
as the consequence of the past according to the principle of being in time…” (p. 31) 
Derrida never mentions this text, nor to my knowledge has anyone writing on 
Derrida.  One would of course presume that Derrida would have read The World as 
Will and Representation.  Confirmation is found in his “Introduction” itself, as 
Schopenhauer is not completely absent from Derrida’s reading of Husserl’s “Origin”.  
The first philosopher Derrida mentions in the footnotes to his Introduction to 
Husserl’s OG, other than Husserl and philosophers discussing Husserl, is 
Schopenhauer.  Derrida goes out of his way to let us know that Husserl’s concept of 
Gegenständlichkeit “is not in any sense tied to Schopenhauer’s concept of Objectität.” (p. 
12, n. 4; trans., pp. 32-33)33  This reference is, for all practical purposes, a reference to 
The World as Will and Representation.  The index to Suhrkamp’s edition of 
Schopenhauer’s Sämtliche Werke lists four mentions of Objectität, three of which are in 
that book. 
III 
When time was at issue, Husserl had a tendency to work out theories which fell victim 
to the very objections he himself had previously posed against the theories of others.  
32 The World as Will and Representation, vol. 1, trans. Payne (Dover, 1969), p. 30.  Schopenhauer, as the 
conditional tense suggests, is actually noncommittal on whether the first knower was an insect, as he goes 
on to talk about the “first knowing animal”. 
33 Schopenhauer’s name, however, will not be found in the index to the English translation. 
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In his book on Husserl, Nicholas de Warren has noted two such cases.34   I have 
argued that a third example is to be found in the problem of prior sense. Husserl’s 
failure to come to a clear answer to the problem, after posing such a failure as an 
objection to Sigwart, should lead phenomenologists to rethink the authority they grant 
Husserl’s writings on time.  If they believe the nachträglich view is the solution, then they 
should consider why Husserl initially thought that the realist view was obviously 
correct, and why he was not only never able to unequivocally commit to an anti-realist 
view, but also, on at least some occasions, continued to think that the realist view was 
obvious to the end, as shown by his remark on geology and paleontology. 
Does the argument made here pose a problem for deconstruction?  We have seen 
that Derrida never discusses the three texts which are central to the problem of prior 
sense, even though he definitely knew of two and probably knew of the third.  What 
are we to make of Derrida’s failure to discuss these texts? I can imagine a number of 
responses to this analysis, but I wish to highlight what I take to be two possible 
implications for deconstruction. 
First, we might take it as a challenge to Derrida’s awarding of a privileged position 
to phenomenology in the founding of deconstruction.  Derrida claims that Husserl 
made certain advances which were necessary for the advent of deconstruction.  
Derrida’s claim that Husserl was the one who made an advance over Kant in the 
articulation of transcendental historicity on concrete experience must be revised.  If 
this was one of those supposed advances, then we can reduce the status of 
phenomenology for deconstruction.  All philosophy deconstructs itself, and 
phenomenology would have no privilege.  Thus the first possible implication would 
distance deconstruction from transcendental idealism, whereas the alternative would 
tie the two much more closely together. 
The second possible implication may pose a much more serious problem for 
deconstruction.  Let’s take Schopenhauer’s text as our clue.  “[T]his first present does 
not manifest itself as the first”:  this sounds like something Derrida could have said, or 
even something he did say:  “the origin is not the origin”.  Within historical 
perspective, use of the concept of retroactivity here appears less to be a significant 
advance over Kant and more like an ad hoc adjustment of Kant’s fundamentally 
ahistorical (and atemporal) philosophy necessitated by the fact that Kant never 
considered the fact that, or even the possibility that, human beings arose at a 
particular time.  No phenomenological or deconstructive insights were needed for 
Schopenhauer to find this solution.  Nor can it escape notice that Schopenhauer sees 
and articulates the problem more forthrightly than either Husserl does (on either my 
34 Husserl and the Promise of Time (Cambridge, 2009), pp. 134 and 135. 
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or Derrida’s interpretation) or Derrida does.  The treatment of this issue by Bataille 
and Heidegger show that no matter how far they were from Kant—and how far they 
conceived of themselves from being—they were still closely tied to Kant in terms of 
this problematic.  As such, their theories wish to place something outside of time, and 
make that something more fundamental than time.  Could it be that Derrida’s theory 
is also too closely tied to Kantian idealism, and thus ends up, contrary to all of its 
intentions, effacing time and falling back into metaphysics?  
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